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2  List of acronyms 
AAA   Authentication,  Authorization  and  Accounting:  security  architecture  for 
distributed  systems,  which  enables  control  of  access  to  a  service  or  a 
resource. 
AES    Advanced Encryption Standard: block cipher standardized by the US NIST in 
2001, based on the Rijndael cipher, with key size of 128, 192, or 256 bits. 
AH    Authentication Header: a protocol of the IPsec suite, provides connectionless 
integrity and data origin authentication for IP datagrams and optionally an 
anti-replay service. 
AKA    Authentication and Key Agreement: procedures for mutual authentication of 
the mobile station and serving system and session-key distribution in UMTS 
networks. 
ARP    Address Resolution Protocol: protocol used for resolution of network layer 
addresses into link layer addresses. 
ASCII    American Standard Code for Information Interchange: a character-encoding 
scheme. 
CBC    Cipher Block Chaining: mode of operation  for block ciphers that  provides 
confidentiality but not message integrity. Each block of plaintext is XORed 
with the previous ciphertext block before being encrypted. 
CL-PKC    CertificateLess Public-Key Cryptography. 
CPU    Central Processing Unit. 
CTR    CounTeR mode: mode of operation for block ciphers that turns a block cipher 
into a stream cipher. It generates the next keystream block by encrypting 
successive values of a "counter". 
DES    Data Encryption Standard: block cipher standardized by the FIPS in 1977, 
based on the Feistel cipher, with key size of 56 bits. 
DH    Diffie-Hellman:  non-authenticated  key  agreement  protocol,  based  on  the 
discrete logarithm problem. 
DHE    Diffie-Hellman Ephemeral: mode of operation for the DH key exchange. 
DoS    Denial  of  Service:  attacks  that  make  a  machine  or  network  resource 
unavailable to its intended users. 
DSA    Digital Signature Algorithm: FIPS standard for digital signatures, is a variant 
of the ElGamal Signature Scheme, based on the discrete logarithm problem. 
DSS    Digital Signature Standard: FIPS standard for digital signature that uses the 
DSA. 
DTLS    Datagram Transport Layer Security: datagram oriented counterpart of TLS. 
DTMF    Dual-Tone MultiFrequency: technique for telecommunication signaling over 
analog telephone lines. 
ESP    Encapsulating  Security  Payload:  a  protocol  of  the  IPsec  suite,  provide 
confidentiality,  data  origin  authentication,  connectionless  integrity  and  an 
anti-replay service for IP packets. 
FIPS    Federal Information Processing Standard. 
GPU    Graphics Processing Unit. 4 - List of acronyms 
 
HMAC    keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code: construction for calculating a MAC 
using a cryptographic hash function and a secret key. 
HTTP    HyperText Transfer Protocol. 
HTTPS    HTTP Secure: protocol for secure communication over HTTP. 
ICMP    Internet  Control  Message  Protocol:  part  of  the  Internet  Protocol  Suite, 
designed for diagnostic or control purposes. 
IETF    Internet Engineering Task Force. 
IKE    Internet Key Exchange: protocol used to set up SA. 
ISP    Internet Service Provider. 
ITU    International Telecommunication Union. 
KGC    Key Generating Centre.  
MAC    Message  Authentication  Code:  tag  used  to  authenticate  a  message  and  to 
provide integrity and authenticity assurances. 
MAC    Media  Access  Control  address:  unique  identifier  assigned  to  network 
interfaces. 
MD5    Message-Digest Algorithm: cryptographic hash function that produces a 128 
bits hash value, designed by Rivest in 1991. 
MIME    Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions: protocol for sending other kinds of 
information  different  from  text,  in  email  such  as  files  containing  images, 
sounds, videos. 
NIC    Network Interface Card. 
NIST    National Institute of Standards and Technology. 
OS    Operating System. 
PBX    Private Branch eXchange: telephone exchange that serve an office. 
PKI    Public-Key Infrastructure: a system for the creation, storage, distribution and 
revocation of digital certificates. 
POTS    Plain Old Telephone Service. 
PSTN    Public Switched Telephone Network. 
RADIUS    Remote  Authentication  Dial-In  User  Service:  networking  protocol  that 
provides AAA management.  
RC4    Rivest Cipher 4: stream cipher designed by Rivest in 1987, with variable key-
length usually between 40 and 128 bits.  
RFC    Request  For  Comments:  memorandum  published  by  the  IETF  describing 
methods, protocols or standards applicable to the working of the Internet. 
RSA    Rivest Shamir Adleman: algorithm for public-key cryptography, based on the 
factoring large integers problem, proposed in 1977, with variable key-length 
usually between 1024 and 4096 bits.  
RTP    Real-time Transport Protocol: transport layer protocol designed for end-to-
end real-time data transfer. 
S/MIME    Secure Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions. 
SA    Security  Associations:  shared  security  attributes  between  two  network 
entities to support secure communication. 
SADB    Security Association DataBase. 
SAKA    Secure Authentication and Key Agreement. List of acronyms - 5 
SCTP    Stream Control Transmission Protocol: a transport layer protocol. 
SDP    Session  Description  Protocol:  format  for  describing  streaming  media 
initialization parameters. 
SHA    Secure Hash Algorithm: family of cryptographic hash functions published by 
the NIST. According to the algorithm produces a 160-512 bits hash value. 
SIP    Session Initiation Protocol. 
SPD    Security Policy Database. 
SRTP    Secure  Real-time  Transport  Protocol:  secure  counterpart  of  RTP,  provide 
encryption, message  authentication,  integrity  and replay protection  to the 
RTP stream. 
SSL    Secure  Sockets  Layer:  predecessor  of  TLS  originally  designed  in  1995  by 
Netscape Communications. 
TACACS+    Terminal Access Controller Access-Control System Plus: networking protocol 
that provides AAA management.  
TCP    Transmission Control Protocol. 
TLS    Transport  Layer  Security:  protocols  that  provide  communication  security 
over the Internet, first defined in 1999 and last updated in 2008. 
Triple DES    variant of DES that increase the key size to 168 bits applying three times DES 
to each data block. 
UA    User Agent. 
UAC    User Agent Client. 
UAS    User Agent Server. 
UDP    User Datagram Protocol. 
UMTS    Universal Mobile Telecommunications System. 
URI    Uniform Resource Identifier. 
VAS    Value-Added Service. 
VOIP    Voice Over IP.   6 - List of acronyms 
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3  Introduction 
When  we think of the telephonic service we  probably think of the traditional analogic 
telephonic service, the Plain Old Telephone Service (POTS), but in recent years  service 
providers are changing their offers to a new kind of offer, the Voice Over IP (VOIP). This is 
a  digital  telephonic  service  whereby  the  voice  is  transported  over  a  packet  switched 
network based on the IP architecture, instead of the traditional system where the voice is 
transported  in  analogic  mode  over  the  Public  Switched  Telephone  Network  (PSTN),  a 
circuit switched network. 
VOIP systems are based mainly on two protocols: H.323 and Session Initiation Protocol 
(SIP). The former is a recommendation from the International Telecommunication Union 
(ITU), while the latter is a standard proposed from the Internet Engineering Task Force 
(IETF). I will focus on SIP, because at the moment its popularity is continuously growing 
mainly as a result of its lesser complexity and better integration with the IP stack. 
The diffusion of the VOIP technology is rapidly increasing as a result of its many benefits, 
one of which is flexibility. With an inexpensive and small equipment, such as an old PC and 
a switch, it is possible to setup a Private Branch eXchange (PBX) and use many features 
that  were once difficult  to have with the traditional telephone service (such as pickup 
groups, conference calls, video calls, mobility of end-points). 
A very attractive feature of VOIP is the fact that it is cost-effective: with an internet data 
contract and an Internet Service Provider (ISP) it is possible to make free calls with other 
VOIP  users;  this  is  one  of  the  main  reason  as  to  why  VOIP  software  like  SKYPE  is  so 
successful.  In  addition  service  providers  are  changing  their  offers  from  PSTN  to  VOIP, 
especially on the business environment, making it possible for call centers for instance to 
simply use an internet connection instead of using several telephone lines, providing the 
same quality of the traditional phone system. Also according to the telecommunications 
company point of view the benefits are huge: for example, in the above-mentioned case of 
the  call  center,  the  use  of  single  data  stream  in  place  of  various  copper  cables  is  an 
enormous advantage.  
However, there are also several disadvantages. In this thesis, I will focus on the security 
problem, more specifically on the security problem from the signaling point of view. The 
switch from POTS to VOIP creates many security concerns, mainly related to frauds and 
confidentiality/integrity of the voice transported. The biggest problem is that it is quite 
simple for an unauthorized person to make a call or impersonate someone else, because 
SIP can work without any kind of security. This thus makes it possible to perform several 
illegal actions such as intercepting calls, trying to defraud the service provider or even 
making calls using someone else's account. For this reason, SIP is equipped with various 
security mechanisms, but they have not often been used. In addition, many of the methods 
that have been used are outdated and are no longer considered sufficiently secure. 
3.1  Outline 
In chapter 4 I will present background information about SIP and IPsec and TLS. In chapter 
5 I will describe the security in SIP. In chapter 6 I will expose my test environments and the 
scope of the test performed, and finally in chapter 7 I will I report and analyze the result of 
the measurement.   8 - Introduction 
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4  Description of underlying protocols 
4.1  Session Initiation Protocol - SIP 
SIP is an application layer signaling protocol for multimedia communication. It is a text-
based protocol that has many elements in common with the Hypertext Transfer Protocol 
(HTTP), in which there is a request/response on text-based messages. Sip is used for the 
setup and the teardown of media session for example for audio or video calls. SIP only 
addresses the signaling part of the communication, while the audio/video traffic is carried 
over other protocol such as Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP) or its secure version, the 
Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP). For handling the media parameters, such as 
protocol or codecs, the Session Description Protocol (SDP) is used, which is carried in the 
SIP message bodies. 
Every  user  is  identified  by  a  Uniform  Resource  Identifier  (URI)  like 
sip:username@host:port.  SIP  can  run  over  various  transport  protocol:  User  Datagram 
Protocol  (UDP),  Transmission  Control  Protocol  (TCP),  Stream  Control  Transmission 
Protocol (SCTP) and Transport Layer Security (TLS). Commonly the 5060 port is used for 
the non-encrypted SIP traffic and the 5061 is used for encrypted traffic that runs over TLS. 
SIP was first proposed as a standard with a Request For Comments (RFC) by the IETF in 
1999 with RFC 2543 and was redefined in a 2.0 version in 2002 in the RFC 3261 [2]. 
SIP uses a set of text messages, mainly being: 
  REGISTER: used by UAC to inform its current IP address of contact. 
  INVITE: used to setup a media session. 
  BYE: used to teardown a media session. 
  ACK: used to confirm a message. 
  CANCEL: used to delete a pending request. 
 
Below are the definitions of the responses families: 
  1xx – Provisional: request received, processing the request. Typical message is the 
100 – Trying, that was used by the proxy in response to an INVITE when forwarding 
the INVITE to another User Agent (UA). 
  2xx – Success: request received and accepted. Typical message is the 200 – OK, that 
the User Agent Client (UAC) of destination sent back to the sender when the user 
answered the call. 
  3xx – Redirection. 
  4xx – Client error: the request cannot be accepted by the server. Typical message is 
the  401  –  Unauthorized,  is  used  when  an  authorization  is  required  in  order  to 
complete an action, such as an INVITE. 
  5xx – Server error: the server failed to fulfill an apparently valid request. 
  6xx – Global failure. 
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Two SIP agents can communicate directly, in a peer-to-peer mode, but usually between 
them there are one or more network elements. Typical elements are: 
  Proxy Server: an intermediary server that receives request from User Agent Client 
(UAC) and makes request  on  behalf of them, the typical function performed are 
routing call from various domains. 
  Registrar: a server that manages the REGISTER messages and keeps track of the 
binding of SIP URI and the socket where the UAC can be contacted. 
  Redirect  server:  a  server  that  generates  3xx  responses  to  requests  it  receives, 
directing the client to contact an alternate set of URIs. 
 
They are distinct logical elements but they can be co-located on the same machine. 
4.2  IP security - IPsec 
IPsec,  abbreviation  of  IP  security,  is  specified  in  the  RFC  4301  [3]  and  is  a  suite  of 
cryptographic services that can provide confidentiality and/or integrity/authentication. 
It is composed of three main mechanisms: ESP, AH and IKE, that I will briefly describe. 
4.2.1  Encapsulating Security Payload - ESP 
Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP), defined in RFC 4303 [4], provide confidentiality, 
data origin authentication, connectionless integrity and  an anti-replay service. The data 
encrypted and authenticated are showed in Figure 1. 
The services provided depend on the configuration. For example, it can provide integrity 
and data origin authentication only, or confidentiality only without integrity. Note that the 
previous one is not a good practice, and without a strong independent integrity mechanism 
can be insecure. The anti-replay services can only be used if the integrity service is used. 
The  RFC  prescribes  that  the  confidentiality-only  mode  may  be  supported,  while  the 
integrity only and the confidentiality plus integrity mode must be supported. 
 
 
Figure 1: ESP in transport mode.  
4.2.2  Authentication Header - AH 
Authentication Header (AH), defined in RFC 4302 [5], provides connectionless integrity 
and data origin authentication for IP datagrams and optionally an anti-replay service. As 
showed in Figure 2, it can provide authentication for some fields of the IP header, as well as Description of underlying protocols - 11 
for  next  level  protocol  data.  It  provides  authentication  only  for  some  IP  header  fields 
because this may change in transit. 
Against the integrity service provided by the ESP the main difference is that ESP does not 
cover anything of the IP header, unless this is encapsulated in another IP packets, instead of 
the AH that cover some fields. 
 
Figure 2: AH in transport mode. 
4.2.3  Operational modes 
The ESP and AH protocols can work in opposition or can be used in composition; both can 
operate in two modes: 
  Transport: in this mode the ESP header or AH header are inserted between the 
original  IP  header  and  the  payload,  so  that  they  protect  only  the  next  layer 
protocols. It is typically employed between a pair of hosts to provide end-to-end 
security services. It is the operational mode represented in Figure 1 and Figure 2. 
  Tunnel: in this mode the original IP packet is encapsulated in a new IP packet and 
the IPsec protects the whole original datagram. This mode is typically employed 
between a pair of intermediate hosts, such as security gateways, in order to provide 
security services between them. They are represented in Figure 3 and Figure 4. 
 
 
Figure 3: ESP in tunnel mode. 12 - Description of underlying protocols 
 
 
Figure 4: AH in tunnel mode. 
4.2.4  Internet Key Exchange - IKE 
Both ESP and AH operate based on requirements defined by a Security Policy Database 
(SPD), and make use of Security Associations (SA). An SA is a simplex connection that 
affords  security  services  to  the  traffic  carried  by  it.  In  order  to  secure  bi-directional 
communication  a  pair  of  SAs  is  required,  one  in  each  direction.  SAs  are  created  and 
maintained by IKE.  
Internet  Key Exchange  (IKE), defined in RFC 5996 [6], performs mutual authentication 
between two parties and establishes an IKE security association that includes shared secret 
information that can be used to efficiently establish ESP or AH. After a couple of reviews, it 
has reached to version 2 in 2005, named IKEv2. Figure 5 shows an IKEv2 exchange. There 
are four kinds of exchanges defined, which are as follows: 
  IKE_SA_INIT: It performs three functions in the setup of the IKE-SA.  
  Negotiates security parameters for the IKE-SA. 
  Sends nonces. 
  Exchange Diffie-Hellman (DH) values. 
This is the first exchange that establishes the IKE-SA and must be completed before 
any further exchanges can take place. 
  IKE_AUTH: It performs three required functions:  
  Transmits identities. 
  Proves knowledge of the secrets related to those identities. 
  Establishes the first, and usually the only, AH and/or ESP CHILD-SA. 
This is the second exchange and must be completed before any further exchanges 
can take place. 
  CREATE_CHILD_SA: This is simply used to create additional CHILD-SAs as needed. 
  INFORMATIONAL:  This  is  a  maintenance  exchange  that  performs  a  variety  of 
functions to maintain the SAs. Some of these functions include:  
  Delete SAs as needed. 
  Report error conditions. 
  Check SA liveliness. 
  Other SA housekeeping functions. Description of underlying protocols - 13 
 
Figure 5: IKEv2 exchange. 
4.2.5  Standard requirements 
The RFC 4301 prescribes for every kind of machine what protocols and operational modes 
must be supported. Requirements are summarized in Table 1, Table 2 and Table 3. In these 
and in all the following tables the keywords MUST, MUST NOT, SHOULD, SHOULD NOT, 
MAY are used and should be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [1]. 
 
Requirement  Protocol 
MUST  ESP 
MAY  AH 
Table 1: IPsec protocol requirements. 
Requirement  Services 
MUST  Confidentiality and integrity 
MAY  Confidentiality only 
Table 2: Services requirements for ESP. 
Type of machine  Requirement  Operational mode 
Host  MUST  Tunnel 
MUST  Transport 
Security gateway 
MUST  Tunnel 
MAY  Transport 
Table 3: IPsec operational modes requirements. 
The  IPsec  suites  is  designed  to  be  independent  from  the  underlying  cryptographic 
algorithms, so it is possible to select  various cryptographic  suites or modify it without 
modifying the entire IPsec protocols. 14 - Description of underlying protocols 
 
At the moment of writing the cryptographic algorithms for ESP and AH are defined in RFC 
4835 [7]. The Table 4 show the algorithms that must be supported for the confidentiality in 
ESP.  
Requirement  Algorithm 
MUST  NULL 
MUST  AES128-CBC 
MUST-  TripleDES-CBC 
SHOULD  AES-CTR 
SHOULD NOT  DES-CBC 
Table 4: Encryption algorithms for ESP. 
The  Table  5  show  the  algorithms  that  must  be  supported  for  the  authentication  and 
integrity in ESP and in AH. Note that the NULL authentication is suitable only for ESP. 
 
Requirement  Algorithm 
MUST  HMAC-SHA1-96 
SHOULD+  AES-XCBC-MAC-96 
MAY  NULL 
MAY  HMAC-MD5-96 
Table 5: Authentication algorithms for ESP and AH. 
4.3  Transport Layer Security - TLS 
The Transport Layer Security (TLS), descendant of the Secure Sockets Layer (SSL), is a 
cryptographic  protocol  that  aims  to  provide  privacy  and  data  integrity  between  two 
applications. It  operates on  the top of a  reliable transport  protocol, normally TCP.  The 
current release of the TLS protocol are the 1.2, described in the RFC 5246 [8]. 
Two layer composes the TLS: 
  TLS Record Protocol: is the lower layer, provides confidentiality and integrity of the 
message. It encapsulates the traffics of the higher-level protocols. 
  TLS  Handshake  Protocol:  operates  above  TLS  Record  Protocol,  provides  mutual 
authentication  and  negotiate  encryption  algorithms  and  secret  key  before  the 
connection setup. 
4.3.1  TLS cryptographic algorithms 
TLS  makes  use  of  public-key  cryptography  for  the  authentication,  symmetric  key 
cryptography for the encryption  of the  data flow, with key generated uniquely for any 
connections, and keyed Message Authentication  Code (MAC) for the integrity, they are 
summarized in Table 6. 
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Service  Algorithm 
Encryption 
AES256-CBC 
AES128-CBC 
3DES-EDE-CBC 
RC4-128 
NULL 
Integrity 
HMAC-SHA256 
HMAC-SHA1 
HMAC-MD5 
NULL 
Authentication/key exchange 
RSA 
DH-DSS 
DH-RSA 
DHE-DSS 
DHE-RSA 
DH-anon 
NULL 
Table 6: TLS cipher suites. 
4.3.2  Description of TLS handshake 
The TLS handshake is composed by a set of messages exchanged by the client and the 
server. The sequence of the exchange is: 
  The client sends a ClientHello message with a list of the supported cipher suites, 
random number, the supported TLS versions and the compression methods. 
  The server sends a ServerHello message with the TLS version, a random number, 
the cipher suite and a compression method chosen from the client’s list. 
  The server may sends its own certificate, depending on the cipher suite. 
  The server may send a certificate request and a server key to the client. 
  The server sends a ServerHelloDone message. 
  The client, if requested, sends its own certificate. 
  The client sends a key depending on the cipher selected, and then begins computing 
the master secret. 
  The client sends a CertificateVerify message which is a signature of the previous 
message using the client’s certificate. 
  The  client  sends  the  ChangeCipherSpec  message  informing  the  server  that 
encryption and authentication starts. 
  The client sends its Finished message, which the server decrypts and verifies. If the 
verification fails the handshake is considered failed. 
  The server sends a ChangeCipherSpec message informing the client that encryption 
and authentication starts.. 
  The server sends a Finished message, which the client decrypts and verifies, after 
that, if the verification is successful the handshake ends. 16 - Description of underlying protocols 
 
 
 
Figure 6: TLS handshake. 
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5  Security provisions in SIP 
As previously mentioned, SIP is a protocol that make it possible to create media-session 
between endpoint, even though it only cares about the signaling part of the session. The 
actual multimedia data flow can be transported in several ways, independent from SIP. For 
these reasons, the RFC 3261 defines a set of security mechanism for protecting only the 
signaling layer of SIP sessions, for the media layer there are many possibilities, like using 
the  secure  version  of  RTP,  the  SRTP.  In  the  next  session,  I  will  expose  the  security 
mechanism that can be used for the signaling level, divided in those that are prescribed by 
the  standard  of  SIP  and  those  that  have  been  proposed  in  literature.  After  that,  I  will 
present what the main vulnerabilities of SIP are and of the presented solutions, explaining 
in detail why I have focused on the signaling plain. 
5.1  Mandatory mechanisms 
The following is a list and a description of the security mechanisms that are described in 
the RFC of SIP. 
5.1.1  Application layer security approach 
5.1.1.1  HTTP digest authentication 
The  first,  and  more  basic,  mechanism  supported  from  SIP  is  derived  from  the  HTTP 
Authentication, described in RFC 2617 [9], and is a stateless challenge-based mechanism. 
The  use  of  basic  scheme  is  deprecated;  SIP  provides  only  the  use  of  HTTP  Digest 
authentication scheme. 
When a User Agent Server (UAS) receives a request can use the 401 - UNAUTHORIZED 
response to challenge the UAC, containing a WWW-Authenticate header, that indicates the 
authentication scheme and the parameters of at least one challenge, like the realm and the 
nonce. An example, taken from the RFC, is the following: 
WWW-Authenticate: Digest 
realm="biloxi.com", 
qop="auth,auth-int", 
nonce="dcd98b7102dd2f0e8b11d0f600bfb0c093", 
opaque="5ccc069c403ebaf9f0171e9517f40e41" 
 
The client response to the challenge resending the request including in it an authorization 
header, like: 
Authorization: Digest username="bob", 
realm="biloxi.com", 
nonce="dcd98b7102dd2f0e8b11d0f600bfb0c093", 
uri="sip:bob@biloxi.com", 
qop=auth, 
nc=00000001, 
cnonce="0a4f113b", 
response="6629fae49393a05397450978507c4ef1", 
opaque="5ccc069c403ebaf9f0171e9517f40e41" 
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The  realm  is  a  string  to  indicate  to  the  client  what  host/service  are  requiring  and 
processing the authentication. 
The response string is calculated as follows: 
response = <"> < KD ( H(A1), unq(nonce-value) 
":" nc-value 
":" unq(cnonce-value) 
":" unq(qop-value) 
":" H(A2) 
) <"> 
Where: 
  A1 = unq(username-value) ":" unq(realm-value) ":" passwd 
  A2 = Method ":" digest-uri-value 
And: 
  KD(secret, data) = the string obtained by applying the digest algorithm to the data 
"data" with secret "secret" 
  H(data) = the string obtained by applying the checksum algorithm to the data data" 
  unq(X) = the value of the quoted-string X without the surrounding quotes 
When using MD5 as digest they became: 
  KD(secret, data) = H(concat(secret, ":", data)) 
  H(data) = MD5(data) 
 
The call-flow of an unauthorized REGISTER request is shown in Figure 7, instead Figure 8 
show the call-flow when using digest authorization. 
 
 
Figure 7: unauthenticated call-flow for a REGISTER request. 
 
Figure 8: authenticated call-flow for a REGISTER request. Security provisions in SIP - 19 
It is possible to see that HTTP digest authentication introduce a high overhead, requiring 
the retransmission of some messages. For example, this means doubling the number of 
messages required for the management of a REGISTER. 
For the RFC proxy servers, redirect servers, registrars, and UAs must implement Digest 
Authorization. 
5.1.1.2  Secure Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions - S/MIME 
For the correct working SIP needs that some field of any message, like the Request-URI or 
the Route header, to be visible to the intermediate nodes, and also these intermediates 
nodes should be able to modify the message, like inserting a Via header. This is related to 
the routing and accounting features. However it is possible to encapsulate the original SIP 
packet into a Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (MIME) body that will be secured with 
Secure MIME (S/MIME, defined in version 3.2 in RFC 5751 [10]). Thus, the original packet 
is  protected  and  authenticated  end-to-end,  but  this  does  not  provide  any  security 
advantage to the network layer, because it does not have access to the S/MIME body. Thus, 
this mechanism must be used in combination with some other security services. 
S/MIME provides confidentiality through encryption and provide authentication, message 
integrity, and non-repudiation with proof of origin by using digital signatures. 
The standard specify the use of the algorithms reported in Table 7 for the digital signature 
of the message and those reported in Table 9 for encryption. In Table 8 is reported the key-
length requirements for the public-key operations. We can see that it makes use of secure 
and well-known algorithms. 
 
Requirement  Algorithm 
MUST  RSA with SHA256 
SHOULD+  DSA with SHA256 
SHOULD+  RSASSA-PSS with SHA256 
SHOULD-  RSA with SHA1 
SHOULD-  DSA with SHA1 
SHOULD-  RSA with MD5 
Table 7: Digital signature algorithms for S/MIME. 
Key-length  Algorithm 
MUST  1024  ≤ 𝑙  ≤ 2048 
MAY  𝑙 < 1024 
MAY  𝑙 > 2048 
Table 8: Key-length requirement for public-key operation in S/MIME, in bits. 
Requirement  Algorithm 
MUST  AES128-CBC 
SHOULD+  AES192-CBC 
SHOULD-  3DES 
Table 9: Encryption algorithms for S/MIME. 
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The main advantage is that encapsulating the payload S/MIME can provide confidentiality 
and  digital  signature  end-to-end  between  host,  that  other  methods  cannot  provide. 
However, the advantages can also be a disadvantage, because encapsulating the original 
packets in the actual one means overhead, doubling up the dimension of the message. This 
overhead can be negligible if seen from the clients side, but it would double the bandwidth 
usage on the proxy side. However, the main disadvantage is related to the usage of digital 
signature, which requires a large-scale Public-Key Infrastructure (PKI) that permits clients 
to verify the original message, also when the original sender is part of another domain. 
Again,  for  RFC  UAs  could  support  the  signing  and  encrypting  of  MIME  bodies,  and 
transference of credentials with S/MIME. 
It  is  noteworthy  that,  quoting  the  RFC,  “future  security  extensions  may  upgrade  the 
normative strength associated with S/MIME as S/MIME implementations appear”. This has 
been written in 2002, and until now very few SIP software that support S/MIME have been 
released.  
5.1.2  Lower layer security approach 
Encrypting end-to-end a message is not a good solution, because it cannot be routed to 
destination, like mentioned above. For this reason, a SIP message cannot be encrypted end-
to-end, but it must be encrypted on a hop-by-hop basis. This implies that there must be a 
chain  of  trust  between  the  sender  and  the  receiver.  For  this  motivation,  the  SIP  RFC 
encourage  using  security  mechanism  at  lower  level.  More  precisely  the  RFC  3261 
encourage using security mechanism at network or transporting layer, like IPsec and TLS. 
It suggests the use of IPsec when there are pre-shared keying relationship or when  an 
association between the hosts can be setup, instead TLS is suggested when there are no 
pre-existing trust associations. 
The  RFC does not  specify  any profile to be  used in IPSEC, instead  for the TLS set  the 
requirements  listed  in  Table  10,  where  the  first  is  the  minimum  requirement  and  the 
second is for compatibility; in addition to these, any other TLS cipher suite can be used.  
 
Requirement  Algorithm 
MUST  TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 
SHOULD  TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA 
MAY  Any other 
Table 10: Cipher suites requirements for TLS in SIP. 
For the RFC the requirements are that proxy servers, redirect servers, and registrars must 
implement TLS, and must support both mutual and one-way authentication, in addition it is 
strongly recommended that UAs are capable initiating TLS. 
Proxy servers, redirect servers, registrars, and UAs could also implement IPsec or other 
lower-layer security protocols.  
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5.1.3  SIPS URI 
Both IPsec and TLS must be used in a hop-by-hop basis, so a host has the certainty of the 
method used only in the first hop, but does not have any assurance of the complete path. 
For allowing the host to have control, an equivalent of the HTTPS URI scheme has to be 
introduced, named SIPS URI scheme. 
When used as the Request-URI, each hop over which the request is forwarded, until the 
request reaches the SIP entity responsible for the domain portion of the Request-URI, must 
be secured with TLS. Once it reaches the domain in question it is handled in accordance 
with local security and routing policy. It is however possible to use TLS for any last hop to a 
UAS. 
All SIP elements that support TLS must also support the SIPS URI scheme. 
5.2  Proposed mechanisms 
Beyond  the  mechanism  discussed  there  are  many  other  methods  proposed  but  not 
standardized yet, or not incorporated into the standard of SIP yet. These mechanisms can 
have some advantages, but at the moment they are not used. In the following section, I will 
present three different  approaches to the problem, to give an idea of what the futures 
developments could be.  
5.2.1  Datagram Transport Layer Security - DTLS 
The RFC 6347 [11] defines the Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) 1.2 standard. It 
is a derivation of TLS protocol, which does not require reliable transport level, so it can run 
over datagram transport protocols like UDP. The reason as to why TLS cannot operate over 
an unreliable transport layer is  because TLS does not allow independent decryption of 
individual records because if a record was lost the decryption of the next record will fail; 
moreover, the handshake layer is  designed assuming that  the handshake messages are 
delivered reliably, and breaks if those messages are lost. The changes introduced in DTLS 
from TLS are mainly for solve these problems. 
The advantages of DTLS is that operating over UDP the transmission requires much less 
overhead, and therefore has a lower performance impact. Furthermore, it is suitable for 
real-time  traffics,  like  other  unreliable  transport  protocols,  and  it  is  also  proposed  to 
transport media streams, so if adopted for the media path it can also be easily used for the 
signaling level. Instead, the main disadvantages of DTLS is that it is more suitable than TLS 
to DoS attacks. The RFC describes a mechanism for protecting the system from this kind of 
attacks, but leaves to the implementers the choice to implement. 
5.2.2  HTTP digest authentication with Authentication and Key Agreement 
In  2002,  Niemi, Arkko and  Torvinen, with the RFC 3310  [12] proposed the use of the 
Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA) protocols within the HTTP Digest authentication. 
The AKA is a challenge-response based mechanism that uses symmetric cryptography, that 
performs  user  authentication  and  session-key  distribution  in  Universal  Mobile 
Telecommunications System (UMTS) networks. It is typically run in a UMTS IM Services 
Identity Module (ISIM), which resides on a smart card like device that also provides tamper 
resistant storage of shared secrets. 22 - Security provisions in SIP 
 
The RFC maps the AKA parameters onto HTTP Digest authentication, enabling the usage of 
AKA as a one-time password generation mechanism for Digest authentication. Moreover, 
because  the  SIP  Authentication  closely follows the HTTP Authentication,  Digest  AKA is 
directly applicable to SIP. 
If a password is chosen by a user, or must be memorized and typed by a user, it must be 
“simple”, like 8-10 printable characters maximum and usually this is not truly random, 
making simple the offline password guessing described in 5.4.2. If the cryptographic secret 
is stored safely in a memory, it can be more complex and more random. This implies that 
the HTTP digest with AKA could require more trials to guess the correct password, and 
therefore makes the dictionary attacks ineffective. 
Moreover, this scheme introduce a mechanism whereby a server may allow each nonce 
value to be used only once by sending a next-nonce directive in the Authentication-Info 
header field of every response and tracking the request using a SQN sequence number, 
protecting the system from replay-attacks. This also protects the client, as he is able to 
detect an old request that has been resent from an attacker. 
Furthermore,  the  AKA  is  able  to  generate  additional  session-keys  for  integrity  and 
confidentiality protection that can be used for some other security mechanism, for example 
for securing the media stream. 
The main disadvantage of this scheme is that it requires every host on which the AKA must 
be  performed  to  have  a  SIM.  This  is  a  strong  requirement,  but  now  the  diffusion  of 
smartphone that can run VOIP services is in a phase of strong growth and customers are 
also getting used to the idea of internet keys. Thus the diffusion of a method like this should 
not  be seen  as a problem but  rather  an  opportunity to increase the number of mobile 
subscribers, perhaps selling traditional-mobile integrated phone services. 
A note is that, like the original HTTP digest authentication, it relies on a MD5 digest. This 
solution should be replaced by other stronger digest algorithm like a SHA2 digest, because 
as we will see later, the differences in performance are not dramatically high but it could 
greatly improve the security for two reasons: one is that  the digest  algorithm is more 
robust, and the second one is that they produces longer digest.  
5.2.3  Certificateless public-key cryptography 
In [13] Wang and Zhang proposed a new mechanism named Secure Authentication and Key 
Agreement (SAKA), based on CertificateLess Public-Key Cryptography (CL-PKC) that was 
originally proposed by Al-Riyami and Paterson in [14] . CL-PKC is an intermediate solution 
between ID based PKC and traditional PKC, which otherwise ID-PKC does not suffer from 
the key escrow problem.  The operation of a CL-PKC is  based on  the idea that, using a 
different construction of the public/private key, the key of an entity can be verified without 
a certificate. For the key generation, CL-PKC makes use of a Key Generating Centre (KGC) 
that computes from the identifiers IDA of the entity A a partial private-key DA. A combines 
DA whit some secrets to generate the private-key SA, and combining it to public parameters 
provided by the KGC, compute the public-key PA. This way the private-key is available to A 
only, and the public-key is not computable by any other entity. To verify a signature it is 
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5.2.3.1  Details of cerfiticateless public-key cryptography 
Al-Riyami and Paterson in [14] explain in detail the operation of a certificateless public-key 
system, that I summarized in the following. 
In the following, 𝔾1 denotes an additive group of prime order ? and 𝔾2 a multiplicative 
group of the same order. We let ? denote a generator of 𝔾1. A pairing is a map 𝑒 ∶ 𝔾1 ×
 𝔾1 → 𝔾2 with the following properties:  
  The map 𝑒 is bilinear: given ?,?,?  ∈ 𝔾1, we have 𝑒(?,? + ?) = 𝑒(?,?) ∙ 𝑒(?,?) 
and 𝑒(? + ?,?) = 𝑒(?,?) ∙ 𝑒(?,?) 
  The map 𝑒 is non-degenerate: 𝑒(?,?) ≠ 1𝔾2 
  The map 𝑒 is efficiently computable. 
The Bi-linear Diffie-Hellman Problem in 〈𝔾1,𝔾2,𝑒〉 is as follows: Given 〈?,??,??,??〉 with 
uniformly random choices of ?,?,?  ∈ ℤ?
∗ , compute 𝑒(?,?)??? ∈ 𝔾2. 
Description of the scheme: 
  Setup: 
Choose an arbitrary generator ? ∈ 𝔾1. Select a master-key ? uniformly at random from 
ℤ?
∗ and set ?0 = ??. Choose cryptographic hash functions: 
?1:{0,1}∗ → 𝔾1
∗, ?2:𝔾2 → {0,1}𝑛, ?3:{0,1}𝑛 × {0,1}𝑛 → ℤ?
∗ and ?4:{0,1}𝑛 → {0,1}𝑛.  
Where 𝑛 will be the bit-length of plaintexts.  
The system parameters are params=  〈𝔾1,𝔾2,𝑒,𝑛,?,?0,?1,?2,?3,?4〉, the master-key is 
? ∈ ℤ?
∗ and message space is ℳ = {0,1}𝑛, the ciphertext space is ?? = 𝔾1 × {0,1}𝑛. 
  Partial-Private-Key-Extract:  
This algorithm takes as input an identifier ??? ∈ {0,1}∗ and carries out the following 
steps to construct the partial private-key for entity 𝐴 with identifier ???: 
  Compute ?? = ?1(???) ∈ 𝔾1
∗. 
  Output the partial private-key ?? = ??? ∈ 𝔾1
∗. 
  Set-Secret-Value: 
This algorithm takes as inputs params  and an  entity  𝐴's identifier  ??? as inputs. It 
selects 𝑥? ∈ ℤ?
∗ at random and outputs 𝑥? as 𝐴's secret value. 
  Set-Private-Key:  
This algorithm takes as inputs params, an  entity  𝐴's partial  private-key  ?? and  𝐴's 
secret value 𝑥? ∈ ℤ?
∗. It transforms partial private-key ?? to private-key ?? by computing 
?? = 𝑥??? = 𝑥???? ∈ 𝔾1
∗. 
  Set-Public-Key:  
This  algorithm  takes  params  and  entity  𝐴's  secret  value  𝑥? ∈ ℤ?
∗  as  inputs  and 
constructs 𝐴's public-key as ? ? = 〈??,? ?〉 where ?? = 𝑥?? and ? ? = 𝑥??0 = 𝑥???. 
  Encrypt 
To encrypt 𝑀 ∈ ℳ for entity 𝐴 with identifier ??? ∈ {0,1}∗ and public-key ? ? = 〈??,? ?〉, 
perform the following steps: 
  Check that ??,? ?𝜖 𝔾1
∗ and that the equality 𝑒(??,?0) = 𝑒(? ?,?) holds. If not abort 
encryption. 
  Compute ?? = ?1(???) 𝜖 𝔾1
∗. 
  Choose a random 𝜎 𝜖 {0,1}𝑛. 
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  Compute and output: ? = 〈??,𝜎 ⨁?2(𝑒(??,? ?)?),𝑀⨁?4(𝜎)〉. 
  Decrypt 
Suppose the ciphertext ? = 〈?,?,?〉 ∈ ??. To decrypt this ciphertext using the private-
key ??: 
  Compute 𝜎′ = ?⨁?2(𝑒(??,?)). 
  Compute 𝑀′ = ?⨁?4(𝜎′). 
  Set ?′ = ?3(𝜎′,𝑀′) and test if ? = ?′?. If not and reject C. 
  Output 𝑀′ as the decryption of ?. 
5.2.3.2  Application of cerfiticateless public-key cryptography to SIP 
Going back to the application on SIP, in [13] the authors prove the security of the scheme, 
that result provably secure in the CK security model and provides mutual authentication, 
perfect forward secrecy and key confirm. The scheme proposed makes use of the challenge 
response handshake of the digest authentication, so it can operate on systems that follows 
the RFC 2617 directive. The  handshake for  a request  like an  INVITE  is represented in 
Figure 9. 
 
Figure 9: SAKA. 
As showed, the handshake allows mutual authentication and it provides a key agreement 
using a Bilinear Diffie-Hellman procedure. If the request is like a REGISTER, that does not 
require the agreement of a session-key, then the computes and the exchange of the keying 
materials ?? and ?? can be omitted. Note that the nonce is defined like function of the realm 
and time, and can be used only once, therefore further protecting from replay attacks. 
The authors have suggested that every SIP domain has its own KGC, this way they strictly 
bind the generation of a partial private-key only to known peers. They also assume that the 
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This  mechanism  has  the  advantages  of  taking  the  benefits  of  public-key  cryptography, 
without the drawback of a large-scale public-key infrastructure. Additionally, it does not 
need a pre-shared key associations between client and server, or between host in peer-to-
peer mode. Instead, the disadvantage is that it requires a completely new infrastructure: 
every SIP domain needs its own KGC, and software or hardware must implement this new 
scheme, so it could be difficult for a large-scale adoption in the near future. 
5.3  Implemented mechanisms 
The commonly used security mechanism used for securing the signaling level of SIP is the 
HTTP digest authentication. It can be used in a standalone version or used in combination 
with some Authentication Authorization and Accounting (AAA) protocols; such as Remote 
Authentication  Dial-In  User  Service  (RADIUS)  or  Terminal  Access  Controller  Access-
Control System Plus (TACACS+). If used in combination with AAA service, the benefits are 
that the shared secret are stored in another machine rather than SIP proxy, usually not 
accessible from internet but only from the local domain. This mechanism is often the one 
used by the service providers. 
For the transport and network layer solutions, both TLS and IPsec is widely supported. 
In  addition,  also  the  network  elements  commonly  supports  both  IPsec  and  TLS.  For 
example the Acme Packet’s Net-Net 4500, a service provider class SIP router, supports up 
to 200000 IPsec tunnels or up to 200000 TLS session with hardware acceleration [15]. 
5.4  Threats and known vulnerabilities 
The SIP protocol is exposed to huge number of  attacks;  the more common  threats are 
registration hijacking, tampering messages and Denial of Service (DoS). 
The  media traffic  is affected by some  particular  security  problems not  covered by  this 
thesis,  but  several  security  issues  that  affect  the  media  streams  are  related  to  the  SIP 
signaling. For example, if the SIP INVITE message, that carries the RTP socket in which the 
client is listening in the SDP payload, is not authenticated an attacker could intercept the 
INVITE and modify the RTP socket putting a new socket over he is listening. So the called 
host sends his media traffics directly to the attackers, that can rely the flow to the original 
sender, making a man in the middle attacks. 
5.4.1  Main attacks 
  Impersonating someone else: an attacker can try to use the identity of another client 
or can  try to operate like a server,  identifying itself  like  the wanted entity, and 
without a strong authentication mechanism a user cannot notice it. 
  Registration hijacking: an enemy can try to use valid credential of another use for 
making calls and putting it in the account of another user or may even try to receive 
the calls that are directed to another user. Moreover, it is possible to de-register a 
valid user from a server, leaving it without the service. 
  Closing session: an adversary can forge request like CANCEL or BYE and cancel the 
processing  of  the  REQUEST  of  a  legitimate  user  or  tear  down  a  valid  session 
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  DoS:  an  opponent  can  try  to  render  a  network  machine  unavailable  to  its  user. 
Usually this is made overloading a server with request. SIP is very sensitive to this 
kind of attacks because of its nature it is normally exposed to internet and there are 
some particular elements of SIP that can be used against SIP itself. For example if an 
attacker is able to spoof some field of a request, like the VIA or Record-Route, it can 
redirect the valid traffic generated by normal UAs to a particular machine. Or it can 
also try to change the registration of a huge amount of user in a registrar server, 
pointing all to the target’s address. All the messages directed to  the user will be 
redirected to target, amplifying the attacks. 
  Eavesdrop: an attacker can try to eavesdrop the media flow between the endpoints, 
this can give him access to confidential information, that could be something that 
the user said or other kinds of media that the user has exchanged, for instance, text, 
image  or  maybe  Dual-Tone  MultiFrequency  (DTMF)  that  could  carry  personal 
information, like the credit card number. 
  Call redirection: an opponent can try to redirect a legitimate call to a different URI 
from the intended one, this way he can try impersonate someone or can simply 
route a call to a Value-Added Service (VAS), and make a fraud. 
 
In Table 11, taken from [16], Butcher et al. have summarized the various potential attacks 
to a VOIP system, it is possible to see that they are related to different levels and have 
different purposes. For example, an ICMP flood has the only scope of disturbing the normal 
service behavior, leaving some users without service, creating a kind of DoS attack. Instead, 
a registration hijacking can have many objectives, attacking also the confidentiality and the 
integrity of the messages. Table 12 shows the possible security mechanisms that can be 
used to protect from various attacks.   
Many of the problems reported are common in all IT scenarios, such as the MAC spoofing 
that is an attack related to the Ethernet protocol suite, and it affects VOIP only because SIP 
operates above it. The reason as to why I focused on the security of the signaling plane of 
the SIP protocol, is because as shown in Table 12, securing the signaling plane of SIP makes 
it possible to protect the system from a wide spread of attacks. Furthermore, I consider 
that many other mechanism, such as OS protection, physical access control or the firewall 
configuration are just good practice in security. 
Another consideration that I have made is that on the traditional phone system, the PSTN, 
there is no protection to the voice traffic, but there is only an intrinsic security for the 
signaling data, due to the physical copper line and the number associated to them. This is 
because on  the  PSTN network  in order to  make  a call  impersonating someone else or 
charging the call to another user, one must have access to the physical cable. This does not 
happen  anymore  when  using  VOIP  and  anyone,  from  any  place  in  the  world,  with  an 
internet connection can try to make free calls or even worse frauds. For this reason I think 
that the first step that has to be made, in the switch to a VOIP system, is to introduce a 
security mechanism for the signaling plane and only after that securing also the media 
traffic. 
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Instead,  the  decision  to  analyze  the  behavior  of  standardized  and  implemented 
mechanisms is due to the desire to give a concrete solution to the problem, with what that 
is already in  commerce, so that  it can  be implemented today. Describing the proposed 
mechanisms, instead, I want to give an overview of what the future developments could be. 
 
Layer  Attack Mechanism  Confidentiality  Integrity  Availability 
Physical  Physical attack  X    x 
Data link 
ARP cache poison  X  X  X 
MAC spoofing  X  X  X 
Network 
Device IP spoofing  X  X  X 
Malformed packets      X 
Transport 
TCP or UDP floods      X 
TCP or UDP replay  X  X   
Application 
TFTP server insertion    X   
DHCP starvation      X 
ICMP floods      X 
Buffer overflow  X  X  X 
Operating system  X  X  X 
Viruses and malware  X  X  X 
Database attacks  X  X   
SIP 
Registration hijacking  X  X  X 
Message modification  X  X   
Cancel/bye attack      X 
Malformed command      X 
Redirect  X    X 
RTP 
RTP payload      X 
RTP tampering  X  X  X 
Table 11: Potential attacks to a VOIP system. 
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Physical access 
control  X                                     
Dynamic ARP 
Inspection     X                                   
OS protection                      X  X  X             
Port 
authentication    X  X  X  X  X  X  X  X  X  X      X  X  X  X  X  X 
Router 
configuration        X            X                   
Firewall 
configuration          X  X                           
Separate VOIP 
and data traffic    X  X  X  X  X  X  X  X  X  X  X      X  X  X  X  X 
Configuration 
authentication                X                       
Signaling 
authentication              X              X  X  X  X  X   
Media 
encryption              X                        X 
Table 12: Security mechanisms. 
5.4.2  Weakness of HTTP Digest Authentication 
I would like to begin this section quoting the RFC 2617, the one that defines the HTTP 
digest  authentication,  which  says  “By  modern  cryptographic  standards  digest 
authentication is weak.”  
There are two main security issues: the replay attacks and a cryptographic weakness. The 
first  problem  is  that  an  eavesdropper  that  intercept  a  message  can  try  to  resend  the 
message after some time to the destination. This could be a problem if the message is for 
example an INVITE because it setup an unwanted call. In order to protect the system from 
this type of attacks the server can implement some particular structures of the nonce. For 
example, some implementations may be willing to accept the server overhead of one-time 
nonces to eliminate the possibility of replay, or can use nonce-count, that is a count of the 
number of request, like retransmission, for that a client uses the same nonce. Security provisions in SIP - 29 
Another  problem  is  that  if  an  attacker  eavesdrops  a  request  that  contain  a  challenge-
response, he knows the response, and username, nonce, realm and URI-request. Therefore, 
it can compute the response guessing the password and if the digest is equal to the one 
contained in the response he will have found the user password. 
In recent years, it has been possible to use the computational power of the GPUs for highly 
parallelized process, with an enormous advantage over running the same process on  a 
traditional CPU. It is the case of trying all possible password. In December 2010, Marc 
Bevand released a tool for cracking an MD5 password, at the speed of 33.1 billion password 
per second on a 2700 $ PC with 4 ATI HD 5970 (dual GPU) [17]. If modified to be usable on 
HTTP digest authentication, the author estimated a speed of about 2 billion password per 
second, due to the fact that one check requires the computation of two hashes, one inner an 
one outer. Moreover, for Moore’s law the performance of the actual PC in these two years 
should  be  about  doubled,  and  in  addition  the  software  could  be  optimized,  so  it  is 
reasonable to believe that at a similar price it is possible to check about 4 or more billion 
password per second. This means that a true random 6 characters alphanumeric password 
could be exhaustive searched in about 15 seconds, that grows to 180 seconds if considering 
all the 95 printable ASCII characters. This estimation is made thinking of the silliest attacks, 
that  try  all  possible  combinations,  but  the  actual  time  could  be  much  lower  if  most 
sophisticated attacks are used, such as dictionary based attack. This off-line guessing of the 
password becomes not feasible if longer and more random password are used. 
I would like to point out that this esteem is based on a single high-end PC, but nothing 
prevents it to run on a cluster of PC or on a cloud based server, however there must be a 
tradeoff between the cost of the machine and the revenue of attack. 
It is noteworthy that this kind of attack requires that the enemy to eavesdrop a request 
containing the authenticate header, and that this header is removed from the message once 
it has been authorized by the server that has challenged the host. Thus, the attacker needs 
to eavesdrop the request in the first hop, the one between the user and the proxy server, 
and  this  could  not  be  easy,  especially  if  the  user  is  directly  connected  to  the  service 
provider. 
5.4.3  IPsec and TLS 
The IPsec does not have any real flaws itself, but there are various concerns regarding the 
implementation of the standard. This is because it is a complex standard, that defines two 
protocols (ESP and AH) for protecting the data, that can work in two mode of operation 
(tunnel and transport), with many options and many degrees of freedom. This leaves the 
implementers the possibility of choice  as of weather to implement or not, and this can 
introduce  several  security  problems,  if  not  correctly  addressed.  Moreover,  several 
difficulties  could be issued from the local policy configured in the SPD, that  should be 
correctly  setup  from  the  administrator,  and  a  wrong  configuration  could  arise  some 
security issues. 
There are also various issues concerning some contour elements: if IPsec protects a data 
stream between two networks but there are some malicious elements in the networks they 
can have direct access to unsecured traffics, or can try to corrupt the actual unprotected 
stream. This is not a problem in TLS, because TLS is tightly coupled to the application and 30 - Security provisions in SIP 
 
encryption/authentication  is  made  on  the  source  machines.  Other  attacks,  like  those 
showed from Degabriele and Paterson in [18], regards the using of encryption only mode. 
They also show that many open source IPsec implementation have some security issues, 
but this derives from a wrong implementation of the RFC. Indeed, they state that all the 
attacks presented in their paper works only because the implementers do not follow the 
RFC. 
Instead Gajek in [19] and Paulson in [20] have deep inspected TLS showing that it is well-
written protocols that realize true secure communication sessions, not finding any effective 
attacks. Although, in the time was discovered and fixed some vulnerabilities, such as the 
recently published Lucky Thirteen attack published by AlFardan and Paterson in [21], that 
apply also to DTLS. The authors demonstrate that an incorrect implementation of low-level 
details can lead to a timing attack that can be used for plaintext recovery.  This attack was 
discovered in November 2012 and when published, at the end of February 2013, almost all 
of the implementation have already addressed the problem.  
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6  Description of the experiments 
6.1  Environment 
All my measures were carried out using two PC: 
  PC #1: it is a laptop from 2008, with a dual core CPU, precisely an Intel Core 2 Duo 
T9300 that work at 2.50GHz and 4 GB of DDR2 RAM memory that work at 333 Mhz. 
This was used as SIP proxy. 
  PC #2: it is a laptop from 2009, which was used as load generator. 
The two PC were connected using a direct Ethernet cable that connects directly the two 
Ethernet  NIC,  without  any  hub,  switch  or  router.  This  was  a  decision  made  for  not 
introducing network delay of variables that is not under my control, like a processing delay 
of an economic switch that can be very different from a professional router. 
On  the  two  PC  Debian  Linux  in  the  release  Wheezy  (7.0)  in  the  64-bits  version  were 
installed with all the update released until the 1 March 2013. 
As SIP registrar server I used Kamailio, the result of the merging of SIP Express Router 
(SER) and OpenSER, at the release 4.0. The choice of Kamailio is because it is only a SIP 
router without any media functionality, rather than other software like Asterisk that also 
integrate the media proxy. In this way, I have focused on a specialized software on SIP 
signaling, rather than using a multipurpose software. 
For the setting up of IPsec, I used Racoon, an IKEv1 protocol implementation, and IPSEC-
TOOLS, an IPsec stack. The fact that Racoon is an IKEv1 protocols does not influence the 
results  of  the  test,  because  the  SAs  was  created  and  the  key  agreement  phase  was 
accomplished before the test began. Furthermore, the analysis of the IPsec setup phase is 
beyond the scope of this thesis. Racoon was setup to authenticate the remote host using a 
1024-bits RSA certificate. 
The details of the environment is summarized in Table 13.  
Purpose  Software 
OS  Debian 7.0 64-bits 
Kernel  Linux 3.2.0-4-amd64 #1 SMP Debian 3.2.35-2 x86_64 GNU/Linux 
SIP router  Kamailio 4.0.0 
SIP load generator  SIPp v3.3-TLS 
Network  Direct CAT-5 Ethernet cable 
TLS/Crypto library  OpenSSL 1.0.1e 
IPsec  Ipsec-tools 0.8.0 
Database  MySQL  Server version: 5.5.28-1 (Debian) 
Profiling tool  Sysprof 1.1.8 
Table 13: Environment specification. 
From the default Kamailio configuration  file  the unused modules  were removed, while 
from the Route routine the processing related to other purpose were removed. The initial 
sanity check was left because it is a form of security mechanism, preventing the processing 
of malformed messages that can be dangerous or may cause performance degradation and 
DoS. The actual configuration file is reported in Appendix A. Instead, the SIPp’s scenario 32 - Description of the experiments 
 
xml  and  an  example  of  the  Comma-Separated  Values  (CSV)  file  used  is  reported  in 
Appendix B. Finally, Appendix C show the configuration used for IPSEC-TOOLS. 
In order to have an idea of the performance of the two machines and an indication on the 
performance of the various algorithms, I run the OpenSSL integrated benchmark (OpenSSL 
speed) on the PC. The result is shown in Figure 10, Figure 11 and in Figure 12. This gives 
an idea of how heavy the various algorithms are. 
 
 
Figure 10: OpenSSL benchmark – digest algorithms. 
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Figure 11: OpenSSL benchmark – encryption algorithms. 
 
Figure 12: OpenSSL benchmark – RSA operations. 
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We can see that 3DES is the encryption algorithm that has the lowest throughput, while 
AES 128 the higher one. Thus, in my test I will use these two cases as lower and upper 
bound for the encryption side. 
For the digest algorithms, MD5 and SHA1 are the one that performs better, while SHA512 is 
worse. Furthermore, according to the block size, HMAC(MD5) performs slightly worse than 
plain MD5, thus I will use HMAC(MD5) and HMAC(SHA512) as bounds.  
Instead, for the RSA operations, it is possible to see just how heavy the operations with a 
4096-bits key are, so I will use 1024 and 2048-bits key, because 512-bits is considered 
unsecure. 
6.2  Measures 
All my tests are about the processing of a REGISTER request; this is because it is a kind of 
SIP  message  that  requires  the  server  to  parse  the  message,  verify  the  authorization 
credentials, register the client and confirm the registration to the client.  It is noteworthy 
that this kind of scenario does not introduce variables like routing, inter-domains policy, 
but is rather intended to measure the impact of security methods on the processing of the 
request in a more accurate way. 
I have ran three main kinds of test: 
  Code Profiling: I profiled the system while running Kamailio on the PC and loading it 
by the other PC whit 200 request per second per 10 minutes. This test shows in 
details  how  the  security  affects  the  performance,  focusing  on  where  the  system 
spends  more  time  and  computational  power.  I  will  analyze  the  results  of  the 
profiling  of  code  under  three  main  aspects:  Kamailio  percentage,  Security 
percentage and Operating frequency.  
  Power consumption: In this experiment, I have measured the power consumption of 
the laptop running Kamailio. I loaded Kamailio with a number of REGISTER per 
second and I measured the absorbed power. For measuring power consumption, I 
used a power-meter attached to the alimentation of the notebook, in order to obtain 
stable and precise results I removed the battery, turned off the Wi-Fi, and set the 
LCD backlight to the minimum. The scope of this measure is to have a metrics that 
can be a concrete parameter for making economic considerations. If you consider 
that  a  server  runs  24  hours  a  day,  365  days  a  year,  increasing  the  power 
consumption of some percent points can be very expensive, and if you are a service 
provider and you have hundreds of servers then this increase can be a deal-breaker. 
  Load test: I flood the Kamailio to see how many request per second the system can 
handle and what is the mean response time when varying the number of requests 
per second. The scope of measuring the response time is to have another metrics 
that in processing of the REGISTER is not so important, but can be of interest in 
processing other request like INVITE, because it directly affects the call-setup time. 
The statistic is collected using SIPp with the option “-trace_stats”. 
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Every  test  was  conducted  in  the  following  scenario:  UDP  without  security  mechanism, 
HTTP Digest Authentication over UDP, TLS, and UDP over IPsec. The first is used for have a 
benchmark of how much the security influences the normal SIP behavior. Table 14 shows 
what modules are loaded on every scenario, Table 15 and Table 16 shows what algorithms 
are used respectively in the IPsec and TLS scenario. 
 
Scenario/Modules loaded  MYSQL+AUTHDB modules  TLS module 
UDP without security  No  No 
HTTP Digest Authentication over UDP  Yes  No 
TLS  No  Yes 
UDP over IPsec  No  No 
Table 14: Modules loaded on each scenario. 
Purpose  Algorithm 
Encryption  Null  AES-128   
Authentication  HMAC-MD5  HMAC-SHA1  HMAC-SHA512 
Table 15: Algorithms used in the IPsec scenario. 
Purpose  Algorithm 
Key-length  1024  2048   
Encryption  3DES  AES-128   
Authentication  HMAC-MD5  HMAC-SHA1  HMAC-SHA512 
Table 16: Algorithms and key-length used in the TLS scenario. 
6.3  Note 
  I noted that SIPp when used to generate TLS traffics could be a bottleneck: if I use a 
single instance, I cannot generate more than about 80 REGISTER per second using a 
2048-bits key, but if I use four instance of SIPp I can reach, 50 request per second on 
each instance, so 200 cumulative REGISTER per second. Using a 1024-bits key, I can 
generate up to 320 cumulative request per second using 4 process. Above this limit, 
the system is not stable anymore, and for example, the sampling period oscillate, not 
giving an accurate measure anymore. For this reason, on the TLS side, I usually 
launch multiple SIPp instance and stay under these limits. 
  When  carrying  out  tests  on  IPSEC  mode  I  used  only  two  security  associations 
between the two PC, one in each direction. I agree that this does not represent a real 
environment, because in the real word in order to allow N host to connect to a 
server, it is required to setup 2N SAs. I made this decision  because in order to 
simulate this on only two PCs, I should setup many IP addresses or socket, and over 
each one I will have to run a single SIPp instance and set Kamailio for listen on each 
socket. Furthermore, once an SA pair is established, this can be left in memory, also 
if not in use, for sometime without the need of rekeying. So my choice was made 
thinking  that  in  steady  state,  the  Security  Association  DataBase  (SADB)  was 
populated and the client who contacts the server does not need to make the IKE 
process. Note that the RFC specifies two kinds of processes for the renewal of the 
SAs: rekeying and reauthentication. In the first case the system considers the SA to 36 - Description of the experiments 
 
still be valid, but it needs to regenerate the session-key, while in the second one the 
parties want to verify each other, in this case the process is equal to a generation of 
a new SA. Rekeying is more frequent than reauthentication. Another notable thing is 
that rekeying and reauthentication can be done independently from the requests, so 
when the system is idle it can initiate the rekeying of a SA, also if not receive any 
request  from  this  host.  This  way  the  host  does  not  have  to  authenticate  in  the 
moment in which it is sends a request. This cannot be done in TLS. 
Thus,  I  think  that  the  authentications  of  new  users,  mixed  to  rekeying  and 
reauthentication of existing user have for sure an impact on the performance of the 
systems, but this is not dramatically high like the one of the TLS. I will consider this 
when analyzing data in the next section. 
  When carrying out tests on TLS mode, instead, I used the TLS multi-sockets option 
of SIPp (-t ln), this way I simulated that every host that wants to register open an 
independent TLS session with the server. 
  For more precision also if the environment is the same the code profiling and power 
consumption  test  was  run  in  two  different  moments.  Therefore,  the  overhead 
introduced by the profiling tools does not affect the measure. 
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7  Analysis 
In this section, I will review and comment the result of the measures.  
Note  that  for  simplicity  in  the  following  I  will  omit  HMAC(),  so  when  describing  the 
algorithm used I will write SHA1 for HMAC(SHA1). 
7.1  Code profiling 
7.1.1  Kamailio percentage 
In Figure 13, I report the percentage of sample that derives from the works of Kamailio. 
This value is the one that Sysprof indicates like “total” and includes all the time spent from 
the Kamailio executable and all the time spent in the external function called from it. The 
last row is a run of Kamailio without any security that is used to have a benchmark. TLS is 
used whit a 2048-bit key. 
It is possible to see that when IPsec is used, the percentage of time worked by Kamailio is 
normally a bit smaller than the no security case. This is because the management of IPsec 
was made from the OS. The percentage of sample worked by Kamailio is smaller when the 
overhead introduced by the mechanism is higher, indeed is lower when using ESP than 
when using AH. Instead, when TLS is used, all the management of the security is made by 
Kamailio itself so the percentage grows.    A different analysis is required for the HTTP 
digest  authentication  case,  because  it  makes  use  of  the  MySQL  server  to  check  the 
credential, so I have reported in blue the Kamailio percentage, and in red I added the 
MySQL server percentage. 
 
Figure 13: Time percentage spent in Kamailio. 
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7.1.2  Security percentage 
In order to obtain a measure of what is the overhead required from the various solutions, I 
summed each symbols that regards the security, like the OpenSSL functions or the internal 
function of Kamailio that regards the digest authentication. In Figure 14, is reported the 
percentage  of  the  sum  of  the  “self-time”  of  security  function  over  the  total  number  of 
sample.  The  no  security  case  is  omitted  because  the  number  of  security  samples  is  0, 
instead in the case of HTTP digest  the security includes the sample of the SQL server, 
because it is used for checking the credentials of the user when the authentication header 
is received. 
Furthermore, we can see that the TLS uses a huge quantity of resource. Instead, in the IPsec 
scenario we can see that this has about a 3 % of overhead when encryption is not used, that 
grows to about 5 % when encrypting the ESP with AES. In the HTTP digest authentication 
case, instead, adding the number of sample of Kamailio’s function related to security and 
the sample related to the MySQL server, the percentage grows to about 27 %. 
 
 
Figure 14: Time percentage spent in security operations in the whole system. 
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7.1.3  Operating frequency 
Another analysis that could be carried out from the profiling of code is about the total 
number of samples. This is related to the operating frequency, because Sysprof makes use 
of hardware performance counters. Therefore, it is possible to see that when TLS is used 
the system works at higher frequency, instead when IPsec or the HTTP digest is used the 
frequency of operation is lower. This means that the system is less busy, and so a lower 
power consumption is expected. The result is showed in Figure 15. 
7.1.4  Profiling overhead 
The last analysis that I want to perform is just a check to verify that the profiling tools itself 
does not influence too much the measured value. For this reason, I have summed each 
symbol that is related to the profiling, and I have reported in Figure 16. As we see Sysprof 
introduces a small overhead, that vary between about 0,8% and 2%. This means that it is 
possible to neglect the variations to true system behavior. 
 
 
Figure 15: Total number of sample collected. 
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Figure 16: Profiling overhead. 
7.2  Power consumption 
Watching the testbed from this point of view it is possible to see how the various security 
methods affect the power consumption of the PC. The difference of consumption derives 
from the numbers of access into the memory, the read/write operations in the HarD Disk 
(HDD) and the frequency scaling of CPU: according to the workload, for reducing the power 
consumption the OS can reduce the CPU frequency. The HDD is another thing that absorb 
much power: it is used greatly when working in HTTP digest authentication mode, instead 
when using other methods the HDD access considerably lower; also in this case when not 
used the system can slow down or stop the rotation speed of the HDD. I measured that, 
when idle, in the conditions described in section 6.2, the PC absorbs 23 W. Comparing the 
measured value when running SIP without any security with the actual one it is possible to 
have a measure of the overhead introduced by the method. I divided the results in two 
figures; in Figure 17 I reported only the measures of TLS, HTTP digest and no security 
cases  only.  This  because  the  throughput  is  too  small  compared  to  the  other  solutions. 
Instead, in Figure 18 I reported the full operating range of other methods than TLS. 
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Figure 17: Absorbed power for no security case, HTTP digest authentication and various TLS configuration, when 
changing the request rate. 
 
Figure 18: Absorbed power for no security case, HTTP digest authentication and various IPsec configuration, when 
changing the request rate. 
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We can see that the TLS is the most absorbing method and HTTP digest absorb a high 
quantity of power if compared to IPsec. So also for this point of view, the IPsec is the best 
performing solution. 
In Table 17, I reported the measured power consumption of the system, and in Table 18, I 
summarized the increase of absorbed power. In both tables, the values are relative to three 
different request rate, precisely at 200, 5000 and 12000 REGISTER per second. We can see 
that at 200 request per second according to the methods used the system can absorb from 
24 W of the no security case, to 34.5 W of the 2048-bits key TLS. This means an increase of 
about 30%. At this rate the HTTP digest authentication absorb about 8% more than the no 
security case; and all the IPsec configuration is between the no security case and the HTTP 
digest, whit the peak  of about  4%  reached by the ESP  using AES and HMAC(SHA1) in 
tunnel mode and a mean of about 2%. At 5000 request per second, the TLS has no measure 
because as previously shown it cannot reach this throughput on my PC. At this rate, the 
IPsec overhead increases slightly, with a mean of about 5%, but the interesting thing is that 
the  HTTP  digest  authentication  grows  exponentially,  reaching  about  a  25%.  Lastly,  at 
12000 REGISTER per second, the IPsec continues to introduce a mean overhead of about 
5%. 
   200  5000  12000 
No security  24  28,5  33,5 
HTTP digest  26  35,5  ND 
AH-transport-MD5  24  29,5  34,5 
AH-transport-SHA512  24,5  31  35,5 
AH-tunnel-MD5  24,5  28,5  35 
AH-tunnel-SHA512  24,5  30  35,5 
ESP-transp-NULL-MD5  24,5  30  35 
ESP-transp-NULL-SHA512  24,5  30  35,5 
ESP-tunnel-AES-SHA1  25  30  36 
TLS 1024-bit AES128-SHA1  31  ND  ND 
TLS 1024-bit 3DES-SHA1  31  ND  ND 
TLS 2048-bit AES128-SHA1  34,5  ND  ND 
TLS 2048-bit 3DES-SHA1  34,5  ND  ND 
Table 17: Power consumption of various security methods at 200, 5000, and 12000 request per second. 
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   200  5000  12000 
HTTP digest  8,33%  24,56%  ND 
AH-transport-MD5  0,00%  3,51%  2,99% 
AH-transport-SHA512  2,08%  8,77%  5,97% 
AH-tunnel-MD5  2,08%  0,00%  4,48% 
AH-tunnel-SHA512  2,08%  5,26%  5,97% 
ESP-transp-NULL-MD5  2,08%  5,26%  4,48% 
ESP-transp-NULL-SHA512  2,08%  5,26%  5,97% 
ESP-tunnel-AES-SHA1  4,17%  5,26%  7,46% 
TLS 1024-bit AES128-SHA1  29,17%  ND  ND 
TLS 1024-bit 3DES-SHA1  29,17%  ND  ND 
TLS 2048-bit AES128-SHA1  43,75%  ND  ND 
TLS 2048-bit 3DES-SHA1  43,75%  ND  ND 
Table 18: Absorbed power overhead relative to the no security case at 200, 5000, and 12000 request per second. 
The last analysis that I can perform is to estimate the number of requests per second that 
the system can handle using the same power. I take the value of 33 W, for which normally 
the  system  is  at  about  70-80  %  of  the  maximum  throughput,  and  compute  the  ratio 
between the rate of the actual method and the one that can be reached with no security. 
The results are shown in Table 19.  
It is possible to see that with the same power consumption the TLS handles about the 2% 
only of the throughput of the no security case, also the HTTP digest does not perform very 
well reaching only the 18%; instead, in mean, the IPsec can manage about the 70%.  
 
  Request per second  % of no security case throughput 
No security  11000  100% 
HTTP digest  2000  18,18% 
TLS 1024-bit  280  2,55% 
TLS 2048-bit  160  1,45% 
IPsec  9000  81,82% 
Table 19: Comparison of the achievable throughput for the various methods.  
7.3  Load test 
7.3.1  Achievable throughput 
I  will  start  analyzing  the  Figure  19,  that  is  a  graphical  representation  of  the  statistics 
collected using SIPp. I have reported the no security case as a system benchmark, to which I 
have overlapped the HTTP digest authentication and the IPsec cases. The TLS cases is not 
reported because, as previously mentioned, with SIPp I cannot reach the actual system 
limit, so I just collected a series of points in which the success rate is equal to the output 
rate. However, from the analysis of TLS made in the other test I can say that the limit that I 
have fixed are quite close to the maximum system throughput. This is because looking at 
the Figure 13 we can see that in the case of TLS with a 2048-bit key, already with 200 
requests per second the number of samples relative to Kamailio represents about 97% of 
the samples of the entire system, so we are close to the maximum of what the server can 44 - Analysis 
 
handle.  Furthermore,  in  section  7.2  the  power  absorbed  for  the  system  in  the  TLS 
configuration at the limit of 200 request per second with a 2048-bits key is 34 W and at 
320 request per second with the 1024-bits key is 34,5 W. In other cases, we can see that the 
maximum power absorbed from my PC is of 36,5 W but sometimes the retransmission and 
the failure starts under this limits.  For this reason, watching the trend reported in Figure 
17 it is possible to see that the stability limit that I have used is close to the maximum 
throughput of the system; hence, in the following I will treat the rate reached using TLS as a 
lower bound. 
Now,  watching  Figure  19,  it  is  possible  to  see  that  also  in  this  test  HTTP  digest 
authentication does not perform very well, with a maximum throughput of 2600 request 
per second, that means that with this methods my server can handle about 17% of the 
throughput  that  can  be achieved  if no security is used.  Instead IPsec, according to the 
configuration, can reach really good result, with a throughput included in the range 12000-
13990 request per second, whit a mean value of about 85% of the no security case. The 
detailed maximum throughput are reported in Table 20.   
 
  Max throughput  % of no security case 
No security  15420    
HTTP digest  2600  16,86% 
ESP-tunn-AES-SHA1  12000  77,82% 
ESP-tunn-NULL-MD5  13990  90,73% 
ESP-tunn-NULL-SHA512  12682  82,24% 
ESP-transp-NULL-SHA512  13199  85,60% 
AH-tunn-SHA512  12823  83,16% 
AH-transp-SHA512  13226  85,77% 
AH-transp-MD5  13798  89,48% 
AH-tunn-MD5  13854  89,84% 
TLS 1024-bit*  320  2,08% 
TLS 2048-bit*  200  1,30% 
Table 20: Maximum throughput achievable by the system.  
*: the values for TLS are lower bound. Analysis - 45 
 
Figure 19: Measured throughput. 
 
Figure 20: Detailed analysis of the ESP using NULL encryption and HMAC(MD5) in tunnel mode. 
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In Figure 20 is reported a detailed analysis an experiment, the one in question is on the ESP 
using no encryption and HMAC(MD5) for authentication. It is easy to see that the success 
rate (red line) grows linearly, following the imposed request rate, that is reported in the x-
axis, until it reaches its maximum and after it drops down. The reason for this fall is that 
the server cannot fulfill the request in before the retransmission timer expires, thus every 
request not processed will be retransmitted generating even more workload (green line). 
After some retransmission, the client will finally mark the request as failed (purple line). 
This is the worst situation, because the user remains without the service. 
7.3.2  Response time 
The second analysis that can be done from this load test is to evaluate the response time, 
that is the time elapsed between the moment in which the client sent a REGISTER request 
to  the  server  and  the  moment  in  which  the  client  get  the  200  (OK)  response.  When 
analyzed the HTTP digest authentication scheme, it still refers at the time from the first 
request to the receiving of the OK response. Thus, the response time reported contains 
both the unauthorized response and the retransmissions.  In order to have more stable 
data, without too many peaks, I filtered the result with a moving average filter of forth 
order. In Figure 21 are reported the measured values for HTTP digest and some IPsec cases 
of interest. I do not represent all the IPsec cases because with all the series the diagrams 
would be difficult to read, thus I reported the IPsec lower and upper bound and two mean 
cases. Furthermore, also in this analysis, I treated the TLS separately and reported it in 
Figure 22. 
Starting from Figure 21, as expected we can see that HTTP digest before the breaking point 
has a response time of about 1 ms, that is higher than the one of the other methods, and at 
the breaking point, the same seen before (2600 request per second), this time grows up 
vertically, due to the start of retransmission. 
The no security and the IPsec cases, instead, have a slightly different behavior,  slightly 
increasing their response time before growing up vertically. Among those tested, the ESP 
with AES-CBC for encryption and SHA1 for authentication in tunnel mode is the one with 
the  worse  performance,  and  the  ESP  with  no  encryption  and  HMAC(MD5)  for 
authentication  is  the  one  that  performs  better.  Before  the  breaking  point  all  IPsec 
configurations, behave approximately as the no security cases.  
For  the  TLS  cases  instead,  we  note  that  the  key-length  is  the  most  influencing  thing, 
because we have a couple of similar lines for every length of key. As expected, a longer key 
means  more  connection  setup  time,  due  to  the  certificate  exchange,  computation  of 
session-key, etc., and this results in a greater response time. The last note is that TLS is the 
method with higher response time, with a mean of 5 ms for a 1024-bits key that grows over 
10 ms for the 2048-bits key. This is negligible for a request like the REGISTER, which is 
usually  handled  by  the  first  hop  server,  but  if  you  think of  an  INVITE  this  could  be  a 
problem, since it has to traverse many nodes each one protected using TLS as enforced by 
the SIPS scheme. This means that at every hop will be added a delay and the user can notice 
it, because it has to wait longer time before the session is successfully created. 
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Figure 21: Response time measured for HTTP digest and IPsec scenario. 
 
Figure 22: Response time measured in the TLS scenario. 
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7.4  Computational power gain over times 
In section 6.1 I have reported the results of the benchmark of OpenSSL on my PC. To have 
an idea of what the future could be, I have made the same test on another PC, a laptop of 
the 2009, with a quad core CPU, precisely an Intel Core i7 Q820 @ 1.73GHz and 4 GB of 
RAM. I reported the results in Figure 23, Figure 24 and Figure 25. It is possible to see that 
by just changing the CPU it becomes possible to achieve about four times the performance 
achievable on PC #1. I want to remark these results because this demonstrates that even 
though at the moment of writing a security mechanism may have appeared too heavy, it 
could become usable in a few years. 
 
 
Figure 23: Comparison of OpenSSL encryption performance. 
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Figure 24: Comparison of OpenSSL digest algorithms performance. 
 
Figure 25: Comparison of OpenSSL RSA operations performance. 
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7.5  IKE overhead 
As explained in section 6.3, all the IPsec result reported in this thesis do not include the 
costs of the overhead introduced by the IKE exchange. 
In order to have an idea of what is the cost of this exchange, I will briefly report the analysis 
made by Shue et al. in [22]. They analyzed the time cost of an IKEv1 exchange, using two 
x86  Dell  Optiplex  GX  Pentium  IV  machines.  The  first  had  a  1,66GHz  processor  and  a 
100Mbps  network  interface  card,  while  the  second  had  a  1,8GHz  processor  and  a 
1000Mbps network card. Both the machines had 512MBytes of RAM and were connected 
to each other through a 100Mbps Ethernet switch. The machines ran Debian Linux with a 
2.6.8 kernel. For the IKE daemon they used Openswan, in version 2.3.1dr3 and Kernel Level 
Internet Protocol Security (KLIPS), the stack provided by Openswan for IPsec support. 
Table  21  shows  the  cryptographic  timing  measurements  for  the  IKE  protocol  for  the 
responder when main mode with digital signatures as the authentication method was used 
for phase one. The reported numbers are averaged over 25 trial runs. As Table 21 shows, 
the biggest contributor to the cryptographic overheads at the VPN server was the RSA 
signature generation. Out of the total 373,82 ms recorded for the IKE process for 3DES, 
including  117,59  ms  for  the  cryptographic  operations,  this  one  operation  took 
approximately 21% of the total time required for the IKE process for all key sizes and 
encryption algorithms tested. However, verification of signatures sent by the client was 
much  more  efficient  (1,07  ms,  1,09  ms,  and  1,06  ms  for  3DES,  AES128,  and  AES256 
respectively). The Diffie-Hellman computations were the second biggest overhead at the 
server, consuming a total of 35,50 ms (17,59 ms and 17,91 ms during phases one and two 
respectively)  for  3DES.  The  overheads  associated  with  symmetric  key  encryption  and 
decryption operations in both phases are quite low and vary with the size of the data being 
encrypted. Finally, hashing contributed the least to the cryptographic overheads. 
 
Operation  3DES  AES128  AES256 
Signature generation  78,8  79,1  78,96 
D-H computation  35,5  35,59  35,5 
Signature verification  1,07  1,09  1,06 
Encryption  0,14  0,34  0,34 
Decryption  0,35  0,11  0,11 
Total of cryptographic operations  118  117,93  117,66 
Table 21: Details of time required for the most demanding cryptographic operation of IKE, in ms. 
From this analysis, we can  see that  in over the overhead introduced is due to several 
messages that have to be exchanged, but is mainly made by the RSA sign operation. In [22] 
this operation take about 79 ms, but as seen in section 6.1, on PC #1 this operation take 
much  less  time  and  even  less  on  PC  #2  as  reported  in  Table  22.  Thus,  the  overhead 
introduced by IKE computation is much smaller on a newer machine.  
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Key-length  Time required on PC #1  Time required on PC #2 
512  0,358  0,108 
1024  1,211  0,340 
2048  7,812  3,003 
4096  56,034  27,275 
Table 22: Time required for RSA sign operation, in ms. 
7.6  Comments 
As explained before, these results are representative of my pseudo-real scenario. Modifying 
the  scenario it is possible that  the results change, but  because I tried to introduce  the 
minimum number of variable that is not under direct control,  the behaviors should not 
change  significantly.  The  thing  that  could  significantly  change  the  result  is  the 
implementation: if in place of my PC is used a hardware SIP router I expect that the result 
could be different. This could derive from many factors, such as: 
  Dedicated  hardware:  are  based  on  hardware  used  only  for  processing  the  SIP 
request. 
  Optimized  software:  makes  uses  of  lightweight  specialized  OS,  instead  of  heavy 
multipurpose OS. 
  Hardware acceleration: can makes use of hardware to speed-up the computation of 
the cryptographic computations, at the same time leaving the CPU free from this 
work. 
 
Moreover, the software implementation can be much or less optimized, and this can change 
the result. For reducing the risks, I used stable and well known software, with years of 
work behind. 
Moving  on  to  review  the  results,  I  deeply  analyzed  three  of  the  well-known  and 
implemented methods for securing the signaling plane of SIP. I think that they could be 
ordered in some way, but each one has its benefits and their disadvantage: 
  No security: is feasible only in a well-protected, not accessible from internet, local 
domain. In every other case, a security is needed. 
  HTTP digest: is the most used, and has some advantages if used in combination with 
an AAA mechanism. From the security point of view is weak, and its performance is 
not brilliant. 
  IPsec: is the best performing scheme tested and it is secure, but it is more difficult to 
setup and may not be supported from all the machines on the net. Also it could have 
some implementation  related-bug.  The system administrator that  decides  to use 
IPsec must consider which configuration to use, because according to the network 
topology and the desired level of security,  it is possible to have various security 
services and achieve different performances. The encryption is not required for the 
purpose  of  authenticating  the  SIP  messages,  but  if  the  overhead  and  the 
performance degradation are acceptable, it allows to give less information to the 
opponent, for instance hiding the number of the client.  
  TLS: is the most secure and easy to configure mechanism, also for the standard it is 
supported  on  all  SIP  UA.  The  disadvantage  is  the  impact  that  it  has  on  the 52 - Analysis 
 
performance. In addition, it requires a large-scale PKI. As for IPsec, the performance 
are  influenced  by  the  configuration  and  the  services  used,  so  the  implementers 
should decide what are the services desired and should consider the security cost. 
 
   Conclusions - 53 
8  Conclusions 
The problem of security in SIP is beginning to be considered important for the economic 
damage that it may cause and for the privacy problems that could arise. The scope of this 
thesis  it  to  give  an  overview,  denoting  advantages  and  disadvantages,  and  to  make  a 
performance analysis of the main actual solutions for securing the signaling plane of the 
SIP. Comparing and discussing them, I want to give a way to choose between them. For 
what we have seen, taking into account that using SIP without security is really dangerous 
at the moment there are many proposed solutions but only few that are really usable, HTTP 
digest authentication, IPsec and TLS. The first, HTTP digest, is not secure if used with weak 
password and should be implemented in the right way for protecting against replay attack. 
The last two, IPsec and TLS, both are good mechanisms, but have disadvantages: IPsec 
must be manually configured for each host and can present some issues related to the 
implementation,  TLS  instead  is  secure  and  scalable  but  has  a  huge  performance 
degradation. The hope is that in the near future unsecure method will not be used anymore 
and hopefully new security methods that can outperform those revised in this thesis will be 
adopted. 
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10 Appendix A: Kamailio configuration 
Below are the used Kamailio.cfg and tls.cfg.  
10.1 Kamailio.cfg 
#!KAMAILIO 
##!define WITH_MYSQL 
##!define WITH_AUTH 
##!define WITH_TLS 
 
####### Defined Values ######### 
# *** Value defines - IDs used later in config 
#!ifdef WITH_MYSQL 
# - database URL - used to connect to database server by modules such 
#       as: auth_db, acc, usrloc, a.s.o. 
#!ifndef DBURL 
#!define DBURL "mysql://kamailio:kamailiorw@localhost/kamailio" 
#!endif 
#!endif 
 
####### Global Parameters ######### 
debug=2 
log_stderror=no 
memdbg=5 
memlog=5 
log_facility=LOG_LOCAL0 
 
fork=yes 
children=4 
 
alias="mysip.com" 
 
listen=192.168.1.6 
#listen=172.1.6.1 
port=5060 
 
#!ifdef WITH_TLS 
enable_tls=yes 
#!endif 
 
tcp_connection_lifetime=3605 
 
####### Modules Section ######## 
mpath="/usr/local/lib64/kamailio/modules_k/:/usr/local/lib64/kamailio/
modules/" 
#!ifdef WITH_MYSQL 
loadmodule "db_mysql.so" 
#!endif 
 
loadmodule "mi_fifo.so" 
loadmodule "kex.so" 
loadmodule "corex.so" 
loadmodule "sl.so" 
loadmodule "pv.so" 
loadmodule "maxfwd.so" 
loadmodule "usrloc.so" 58 - Appendix A: Kamailio configuration 
 
loadmodule "registrar.so" 
loadmodule "textops.so" 
loadmodule "siputils.so" 
loadmodule "xlog.so" 
loadmodule "sanity.so" 
loadmodule "ctl.so" 
loadmodule "cfg_rpc.so" 
loadmodule "mi_rpc.so" 
 
#!ifdef WITH_AUTH 
loadmodule "auth.so" 
loadmodule "auth_db.so" 
#!endif 
 
#!ifdef WITH_TLS 
loadmodule "tls.so" 
#!endif 
 
# ----------------- setting module-specific parameters ---------------
# 
# ----- mi_fifo params -----# 
modparam("mi_fifo", "fifo_name", "/tmp/kamailio_fifo") 
 
# ----- registrar params -----# 
modparam("registrar", "method_filtering", 1) 
/* uncomment the next line to disable parallel forking via location */ 
# modparam("registrar", "append_branches", 0) 
/* uncomment the next line not to allow more than 10 contacts per AOR 
*/ 
#modparam("registrar", "max_contacts", 10) 
modparam("registrar", "min_expires", 0) 
# max value for expires of registrations 
modparam("registrar", "max_expires", 1) 
# set it to 1 to enable GRUU 
modparam("registrar", "gruu_enabled", 0) 
 
# ----- auth_db params -----# 
#!ifdef WITH_AUTH 
modparam("auth_db", "db_url", DBURL) 
modparam("auth_db", "calculate_ha1", yes) 
modparam("auth_db", "password_column", "password") 
modparam("auth_db", "load_credentials", "") 
modparam("auth_db", "use_domain", 0) 
#!endif 
 
#!ifdef WITH_TLS 
# ----- tls params -----# 
modparam("tls", "config", "/usr/local/etc/kamailio/tls.cfg") 
#!endif 
 
####### Routing Logic ######## 
request_route { 
 
  # per request initial checks 
  route(REQINIT); 
 
  # authentication Appendix A: Kamailio configuration - 59 
  route(AUTH); 
 
  # handle registrations 
  route(REGISTRAR); 
} 
# Per SIP request initial checks 
route[REQINIT] { 
  if (!mf_process_maxfwd_header("10")) { 
    sl_send_reply("483","Too Many Hops"); 
    exit; 
  } 
  if(!sanity_check("1511", "7")) 
  { 
    xlog("Malformed SIP message from $si:$sp\n"); 
    exit; 
  } 
} 
# Handle SIP registrations 
route[REGISTRAR] { 
  if (is_method("REGISTER")) 
  { 
    if (!save("location")) 
      sl_reply_error(); 
    exit; 
  } 
} 
# Authentication route 
route[AUTH] { 
#!ifdef WITH_AUTH 
  if (is_method("REGISTER") || from_uri==myself) 
  { 
    # authenticate requests 
    if (!auth_check("$fd", "subscriber", "1")) { 
      auth_challenge("$fd", "0"); 
      exit; 
    } 
    # user authenticated - remove auth header 
    if(!is_method("REGISTER|PUBLISH")) 
      consume_credentials(); 
  } 
  # if caller is not local subscriber, then check if it calls 
  # a local destination, otherwise deny, not an open relay here 
  if (from_uri!=myself && uri!=myself) 
  { 
    sl_send_reply("403","Not relaying"); 
    exit; 
  } 
#!endif 
  return; 
} 
10.2 Tls.cfg 
[server:default] 
verify_certificate = no 
require_certificate = no 
method = TLSv1 
#cipher_list="DES-CBC3-SHA" 60 - Appendix B: SIPp configuration 
 
cipher_list="AES128-SHA" 
 
###1024 bit 
#private_key = /usr/local/etc/kamailio/server1024key.pem 
#certificate = /usr/local/etc/kamailio/server1024.pem 
 
###2048 bit 
private_key = /usr/local/etc/kamailio/server2048key.pem 
certificate = /usr/local/etc/kamailio/server2048.pem 
 
ca_list = /usr/local/etc/kamailio/calist.pem 
 
[client:default] 
verify_certificate = yes 
require_certificate = yes 
11 Appendix B: SIPp configuration 
11.1 Register.xml 
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1" ?> 
<scenario name="register_client"> 
  <send retrans="500" start_rtd="1"> 
    <![CDATA[ 
 
      REGISTER sip:mysip.com SIP/2.0 
      Via: SIP/2.0/[transport] [local_ip]:[local_port];branch=[branch] 
      From: sipp <sip:[field0]@mysip.com>;tag=[call_number] 
      To: sut <sip:[field0]@mysip.com> 
      Call-ID: [call_id] 
      CSeq: 4 REGISTER 
      Contact: sip:[field0]@[local_ip]:[local_port] 
      Expires: 60 
      Max-Forwards: 70 
      Subject: Performance Test 
      Content-Type: application/sdp 
      Content-Length: [len] 
    ]]> 
  </send> 
 
  <recv response="200" crlf="true" rtd="1"> 
  </recv> 
</scenario> 
11.2 Register-whith-HTTP-digest.xml 
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1" ?>  
<scenario name="register_client"> 
  <send retrans="500" start_rtd="1"> 
    <![CDATA[ 
  
      REGISTER sip:mysip.com SIP/2.0 
      Via: SIP/2.0/[transport] [local_ip]:[local_port];branch=[branch] 
      From: sipp <sip:[field0]@mysip.com>;tag=[call_number] 
      To: sut <sip:[field0]@mysip.com:[local_port]> 
      Call-ID: [call_id] 
      CSeq: 4 REGISTER Appendix B: SIPp configuration - 61 
      Contact: sip:[field0]@[local_ip]:[local_port] 
      Expires: 60 
      Max-Forwards: 70 
      Subject: Performance Test 
      Content-Type: application/sdp 
      Content-Length: [len] 
    ]]> 
  </send> 
 
  <recv response="401" auth="true"> 
  </recv> 
  
  <send retrans="500"> 
    <![CDATA[ 
 
      REGISTER sip:mysip.com SIP/2.0 
      Via: SIP/2.0/[transport] [local_ip]:[local_port];branch=[branch] 
      From sipp <sip:[field0]@mysip.com>;tag=[call_number] 
      To: sut <sip:[field0]@mysip.com:[local_port]> 
      Call-ID: [call_id] 
      [field1] 
      CSeq: 4 REGISTER 
      Contact: sip:[field0]@[local_ip]:[local_port] 
      Expires: 60 
      Max-Forwards: 70 
      Subject: Performance Test 
      Content-Type: application/sdp 
      Content-Length: [len]  
    ]]> 
  </send> 
  
  <recv response="200" rtd="1"> 
  </recv> 
 
</scenario> 
11.3 User.csv 
The following are the first rows of the user.csv. 
SEQUENTIAL 
1;[authentication username=1 password=1] 
2;[authentication username=2 password=2] 
3;[authentication username=3 password=3] 
… 
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12 Appendix C: IPsec-tools configuration 
12.1 Racoon.conf 
The following is the interesting part of the Racoon configuration file. In the “sainfo” part, 
the encryption_algorithm can be either AES or NULL_ENC  according to the configuration. 
The authentication_algorithm instead can be HMAC_MD5, HMAC_SHA1 or HMAC_SHA512. 
remote anonymous { 
        exchange_mode main,aggressive; 
… 
        proposal { 
                encryption_algorithm aes; 
                hash_algorithm sha1; 
                authentication_method rsasig; 
                dh_group 2; 
        } 
… 
} 
 
sainfo anonymous { 
        pfs_group 2; 
        encryption_algorithm aes; 
        authentication_algorithm hmac_sha1; 
        compression_algorithm deflate; 
} 
12.2 Ipsec-tools.conf 
The following is the interesting part of the IPsec-tools configuration file. According to the 
desired service uncommented the corresponding lines. 
#!/usr/sbin/setket -f 
flush; 
spdflush; 
 
#######ESP 
spdadd 172.1.5.1 172.1.6.1 any -P out ipsec  
esp/tunnel/192.168.1.5-192.168.1.6/require; 
spdadd 172.1.6.1 172.1.5.1 any -P in ipsec   
esp/tunnel/192.168.1.6-192.168.1.5/require; 
 
#spdadd 172.1.5.1 172.1.6.1 any -P out ipsec  
esp/transport//require; 
#spdadd 172.1.6.1 172.1.5.1 any -P in ipsec 
esp/transport//require; 
 
#######AH 
#spdadd 172.1.5.1 172.1.6.1 any -P out ipsec  
ah/tunnel/192.168.1.5-192.168.1.6/require; 
#spdadd 172.1.6.1 172.1.5.1 any -P in ipsec   
ah/tunnel/192.168.1.6-192.168.1.5/require; 
 
#spdadd 172.1.5.1 172.1.6.1 any -P out ipsec  
ah/transport//require; 
#spdadd 172.1.6.1 172.1.5.1 any -P in ipsec   
ah/transport//require; 